# Post-2011 Review Eugene Big Tent Meeting

Workgroup 1 Presentation:
Initial Analysis of Funding
Alternatives for Self-Management of
Utility Incentives

March 20, 2014



### What is the workgroup trying to solve?

- How do we achieve BPA's savings goals while:
  - A. relieving pressure on BPA's capital borrowing;
  - B. offering customers some flexibility (e.g., 100% or partial self-management of incentives);
  - C. offering some customers the ability to avoid having BPA incur capital costs on their behalf; and
  - D. avoiding complicated and costly implementation of alternatives?

# Separating the Components

- 1. How should BPA finance the incentive costs for BPA's savings acquisition?
  - Expense
  - Capital
  - Relationship between near/long term costs
- 2. How should BPA structure its incentive funding relationship with customers?
  - Alternatives are considered in the following slides

## Some Working Assumptions...

- All non-incentive EE costs (e.g., regional third party contract costs) are collected on a TOCA-basis, which is no change from the status quo, and the alternatives are focused only on incentives.
- These scenarios are the result of conversations within the workgroup and not representative of the views of BPA Finance Dept.
- Members of the workgroup that work on rates have performed an initial analysis on the impacts on rates. They estimate ~\$20M shift from capital to expense equates to ~1% rate increase in the PF rate.
- Energy Efficiency is currently indifferent to how funds are allocated (capital or expensed), but recognize the CIR and IPR processes underway.
- As we work through the options, we recognize other pros/cons may surface as conversations continue. These alternatives may not be mutually exclusive. Please consider offering additional insights as each option is presented.

## Status Quo

Brief description	Pros	Cons	Implications/Additional Considerations
75/25 programmatic split remains and incentives continue to be capitalized	<ul> <li>Keeps things simple</li> <li>Model is understood</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Doesn't fully address some customers' concerns about BPA incurring capital costs on their behalf</li> <li>Doesn't provide an option for 100% self-management of incentives</li> <li>Doesn't relieve any EE pressure on BPA's capital borrowing</li> <li>Higher overall costs in the long run due to borrowing costs</li> </ul>	

#### Revise down the 75/25 programmatic split

Brief description	Pros	Cons	Implications/Additional Considerations
Customers, on average, take on more responsibility for delivering savings without BPA funding, which would result in proportionally reduced EEI budgets for all customers	<ul> <li>Partially addresses some customers' concerns about BPA incurring capital costs on their behalf when they expense conservation at the retail level</li> <li>Relieves some EE pressure on BPA's capital borrowing</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Doesn't fully address some customers' concerns about BPA incurring capital costs on their behalf</li> <li>Doesn't provide an option for 100% self-management of incentives</li> <li>Higher overall costs in the long run due to borrowing costs (as it relates to the Expense Rate Credit option)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>As the percentages change and less funding flows through BPA, what accountability mechanism would be needed to ensure adequate savings are delivered to meet BPA's savings commitments?</li> <li>If utility self funding percentage increases, this would proportionally reduce EEI budget allocations</li> <li>May result in increased accountability for utilities</li> </ul>

## **Conservation Prepay**

Note: Workgroup One's consensus was to drop this option for active consideration due to lack of support

Brief description	Pros	Cons	Implications/Additional Considerations
Customers would bring capital to BPA in exchange for a rate credit that repays the prepaid capital with interest	<ul> <li>Addresses some customers' concerns about BPA incurring capital costs on their behalf</li> <li>Relieves some EE pressure on BPA's capital borrowing</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Doesn't provide an option for 100% self-management of incentives</li> <li>Transaction costs considerations may limit the number of customers able to participate</li> <li>Higher overall costs in the long run due to borrowing costs</li> </ul>	Is this option only about finding an alternative capital source or do participating customers want additional changes?

## **Expense Rate Credit**

Brief description	Pros	Cons	Implications/Additional Considerations
The EE capital budget would be moved to expense and customers would receive their EEI budgets broken down into a monthly rate credit	<ul> <li>Addresses some customers' concerns about BPA incurring capital costs on their behalf</li> <li>Relieves all EE pressure on BPA's capital borrowing</li> <li>Lower overall costs in the long run due to no borrowing costs</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Doesn't provide an option for 100% self-management of incentives</li> <li>Near term rate impact for customers (there's flexibility on the timing of the transition to expense)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>How would the program be designed differently, if at all, from the last rate credit construct, i.e., would there be an opportunity to improve on the previous expense rate credit?</li> <li>Possible transition option, such as 50/50 split</li> <li>Rate impacts</li> <li>Previous CRC budgets were ~50% of current EEI budgets (less rate impact). Keep in mind EEI budgets are rising</li> <li>Are there implications for reporting of savings to BPA</li> </ul>

# Capital Rate Credit

Brief description	Pros	Cons	Implications/Additional Considerations
A monthly rate credit–for debt service costs not incurred—would be given to those customers that elect to 100% self-finance their savings acquisition	<ul> <li>Addresses some customers' concerns about BPA incurring capital costs on their behalf</li> <li>Relieves some EE pressure on BPA's capital borrowing</li> <li>Provides an option for 100% self-management of incentives</li> <li>Would not change the cost structure for those remaining customers.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Is very complicated from a BPA cost recovery/rate making perspective</li> <li>Could significantly increase IT costs for rates/billing purposes. Should those costs be borne by those utilities choosing to self-manage?</li> <li>Less higher overall costs in the long run due to borrowing costs</li> <li>Could impact cash flow due to loss of EEI</li> </ul>	For those customers     electing the capital rate     credit, what accountability     mechanism would be     needed to ensure savings     are delivered and would     other customers be     impacted either from a     budget or savings delivery     expectation perspective?

## Flexible Budgets – Rate Adder

Brief description	Pros	Cons	Implications/Additional Considerations
Customers can elect more or less than their TOCA-based BPA incentive budgets; costs are collected in rates in the form of a rate adder (as opposed to a credit approach)	<ul> <li>Addresses some customers' concerns about BPA incurring capital costs on their behalf</li> <li>Provides an option for 100% self-management of incentives</li> <li>If capitalized, relieves some EE pressure on BPA's capital borrowing</li> <li>Is simpler from a BPA cost recovery/rate making perspective than some other options</li> <li>Provides all customers flexibility whether incentives are expensed or capitalized</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Makes for a more complicated BPA budgeting process due to customer flexibility</li> <li>If incentives are capitalized, higher overall costs in the long run due to borrowing costs</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Would the approach work if EEI is expensed?</li> <li>What would be BPA's backstop role in this approach?</li> <li>What accountability mechanism would be needed to ensure adequate savings are delivered to meet BPA's savings commitments?</li> <li>What are the implications for BPA budgeting if customers are able to elect their budget amounts? Advance budget commitments?</li> <li>Could budget flexibility be used to address capturing large projects?</li> </ul>