

Bonneville's Public Engagement for Establishing a Policy Direction on Potential Day Ahead Market Participation Workshop 3

October 23, 2023

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- Opening Remarks from BPA Goals of the Meeting (10 Min)
- E3 Overview of Western Market Exploratory Group (WMEG) Cost Benefit Study (CBS) (60 Min)
- Initial takeaways from WMEG result
- Considerations for BPA's Day-Ahead Market (DAM)
 Business Case Analysis
- Next Steps and the November Workshop Q&A (10 Min)
- Closeout (5 Min)



Opening Remarks



- Bonneville views the results as evaluating the production cost benefit for BPA and the West
- The study is more illustrative of the impact of various market footprints than it is of specific market design elements
 - EDAM Bookend more properly characterized as benefits possible from a West-wide market footprint
 - Markets+/EDAM split describes how benefits change if there are two market footprints




- The WMEG Study Results will be one consideration in BPA's process for determining its policy direction or subsequent decisions regarding DAM participation in a rapidly changing external environment
 - Some utilities have announced day-ahead market participation, and others will make decisions about day-ahead market participation in the next few years.
 - BPA views these initial steps towards participation as an indication that there will be fewer opportunities for bilateral trading reflected in the BAU case.
 - New governance structures for markets are being proposed and implemented throughout the West
- Today's conversations represents one element of the business case that Bonneville will use in helping arrive at a leaning in 2024
- Bonneville has not made any proposals about a leaning in 2024

- Study Results
 - CBS narrative and quantitative materials produced are posted on the BPA website with meeting materials
- Conversations will focus on WMEG Cost Benefit Study (CBS) results
 - BPA will begin compare the California Independent System Operator (CAISO)'s EDAM and Southwest Power Pool (SPP)'s Markets+ against a non-market alternative during the November 29th workshop

BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION

E3 presentation on WMEG study

(They will present from a separate slide deck)
Their materials will be posted with materials for public record



Initial Takeaways from WMEG Study Results






- The WMEG results clearly show the potential for BPA to achieve financial benefits from DAM participation
- Footprint and transmission connectivity are significant drivers of monetary benefits and are two of the many considerations BPA is evaluating

- BPA is considering all elements of the benefits articulated in the WMEG study as well as tradeoffs that exist across the presented DAM footprint scenarios
- BPA's decision-making process will analyze DAM impacts on transmission revenue and will take into consideration E3's results

- While the WMEG results suggests significant benefits from a West-wide market footprint, BPA recognizes:
 - The West has yet to agree on a governance model that works for the entire region, which has been a barrier to the development of a single West-wide market
 - A single market footprint is also influenced by the decision many entities are currently pursuing:
 - A few entities have made declarations of their intent to participate in EDAM
 - One entity has made a declaration of their intent to participate in M+
 - Other entities are exploring participation in RTO West
 - BPA will take all these factors into consideration when it evaluates DAM alternatives according to our decision-making principles.

- BPA has developed a set of principles that will guide the evaluation of two market options through the remainder of Bonneville's stakeholder process
- Bonneville will utilize WMEG results where appropriate to provide quantitative values
- See appendix for a visual of how business case considerations tie to BPA's DAM evaluation principles as well as the public comment themes following the first workshop



*Considerations linked to business evaluation criteria

Out of market actions (price suppression measures)

Viability of Market Operator for further market developments (RTO Optionality value)

Effective use of the Transmission system

Compensation for Flexible Capacity

Generation/Load benefit estimate (E3)

Market Liquidity

Transmission Cost Shifts

BPA implementation costs

Market funding

Market price levels

RC change cost

**Considerations linked to customers evaluation criteria

Out of market actions (price suppression measures)

Effective use of the Transmission system

Generation/Load benefit estimate (E3)

Compensation for Flexible Capacity

Market Liquidity

Transmission Products and Services

Market price levels

- Bonneville recognizes that the following assumptions are not addressed in the WMEG results:
 - Additional consideration of BAU case(s)
 - Revenue and cost volatility driven by Hydro variability
 - Hurdle rate impacts in the DAM case



Q&A and Closeout



- Please submit comments on this workshop by November 20th
- The next public workshop will be November 29th (previously scheduled for-November 15th)
- Please send to <u>techforum@bpa.gov</u> (with "DAM Participation Evaluation" in the subject heading)
 - All formal feedback received will be posted to the BPA.gov page for BPA's DAM Participation Evaluation



Appendix




- Revenue that transmission providers earn by selling transmission service
- Calculated in the model for each entity based on the product of
 - the amount of energy exported over transmission lines connected to that entity, times
 - the OATT rate or market wheeling rate applicable that BAA or transmission entity, plus an additional \$/MWh charge for bilateral day ahead market friction
- Total wheeling revenue is first determined at a market-footprint level
 - Amount of energy flowing exported over transmission lines connected to each market footprint (multiplied by)
 - The load-weighted average of OATT rates of zones participating in that market, plus an additional \$/MWh charge for transactional friction on seams between the markets
- This total market wheeling revenue is then distributed among market participants based on each participant's loadratio share basis.
- The study approach did not attempt to capture existing transmission contracts in the BAU case, which may impact
 how these revenues would actually be distributed. Some entities may choose to discount the impact of wheeling
 revenues when analyzing their individual results

Wheeling Revenue in WMEG

- All footprints in the study reflect a significant decline in Wheeling Revenue for Bonneville
- Study assumed that no Wheeling Revenue would be collected for dispatches inside the modeled footprint
 - The study generally assumes a 1:1 revenue loss for market dispatches (a MW of market dispatch leads to a lost MW of transmission revenue)
- The potential reduction of Wheeling Revenue has been identified in each respective day-ahead market design
 - Rate mechanisms, as part of market design, are being explored to maintain existing short term transmission revenue for transmission providers
 - Long Term transmission revenue will need to continue to be monitored
 - · Market design may incent continued holding of existing long-term transmission reservations
- Caution should be given to assuming that declines in Wheeling Revenue will materialize as depicted in the study
 - BPA is among many transmission providers with overwhelmingly long-term subscription of transmission and that assumption does not hold true (this was recognized in the WMEG report)
 - BPA is encouraged by the development of revenue streams for TSPs in both day-ahead markets
- Both EDAM and M+ recognize a reduction of STF and NT revenue for TSP and will have revenue recovery mechanisms for TSPs to recover costs.
- WRAP 75% forward showing of firm transmission capacity requirement incents continued holding of long-term transmission
- M+ proposed market design provides congestion revenue to transmission contract holders




Member Cost & Benefit (2026) All prices in \$2021



			Case		
Cost/Benefit (\$ millions)	BAU (2026)	BAU High Hurdle (2026)	EDAM Bookend (2026)	Markets Bookend (2026)	Main Split (2026)
Load Cost	921.7	813.9	944.0	902.3	923.6
Generation Cost	131.3	131.3	131.3	131.3	131.3
Reserve Cost	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2
Generation Revenue	-1343.1	-1040.5	-1489.6	-1328.6	-1370.3
Reserve Revenue	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Wheeling Revenue	-251.4	-493.8	-5.5	-31.8	-31.8
Congestion Revenue	-49.9	-47.3	-60.1	-52.7	-52.7
GhG Revenue	0.0	0.0	-0.1	-0.8	-0.8
Net Cost	-591.3	-636.4	-480.1	-380.3	-400.5



Member Cost & Benefit (2026) All prices in \$2021




		Case						
Cost/Benefit (\$ millions)	BAU (2026)	EDAM Bookend (2026)	Markets Bookend (2026)	Main Split (2026)	Alt Split 1 (2026)	Alt Split 2 (2026)	Alt Split 3 (2026)	Alt Split 4 (2026)
Load Cost	921.7	944.0	902.3	923.6	919.2	982.0	840.4	860.9
Generation Cost	131.3	131.3	131.3	131.3	131.3	131.3	131.3	131.3
Reserve Cost	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
Generation Revenue	-1343.1	-1489.6	-1328.6	-1370.3	-1359.5	-1514.7	-1151.6	-1220.0
Reserve Revenue	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Wheeling Revenue	-251.4	-5.5	-31.8	-31.8	-63.3	-6.4	-92.1	-47.3
Congestion Revenue	-49.9	-60.1	-52.7	-52.7	-48.3	-49.1	-51.5	-48.3
GhG Revenue	0.0	-0.1	-0.8	-0.8	-0.7	-0.1	-0.6	-0.5
Net Cost	-591.3	-480.1	-380.3	-400.5	-421.3	-457.1	-324.0	-323.9



- E3 utilized positive numbers as costs and negative numbers as revenue in the WMEG CBS
 - \bullet This same sign scheme is continued within the following slides when showing the Δ for each category
 - Color coding icons accompany each Δ as an indicator of whether Δ is higher or lower than Business As Usual (e.g. a delta still represents revenue, and the color then indicates if the revenue is an increase or decrease compared to the BAU)
 - Cost Category (Positive Number)
 - Reve<u>nu</u>e Category (Negative Number)

 - **Q** = Revenue Increase (relative to Business As Usual)
 - "Net Cost" category
 - The second of the second of

BPA Result - Single Market Scenario – 2026 PDAM Results



BPA EDAM Table (W/O Wheeling Revenue)

Cost/Benefit (\$ millions)

BAU (2026)

EDAM Bookend (2026)

Δ Cost/Benefit Category

EDAM Bookend vs BAU

Load Cost

921.7

944.0

Δ Load Cost

22.2

[Negative Numbers = Revenue] [Positive Numbers = Costs]

	ė.			
Load Cost	921.7	944.0	Δ Load Cost	22.2
Generation Cost	131.3	131.3	-	-
Reserve Cost	0.0	0.0	-	-
Generation Revenue	-1343.1	-1489.6	Δ Generation Revenue	-146.6
Reserve Revenue	0.0	0.0	-	-
Congestion Revenue	-49.9	-60.1	Δ Congestion Revenue	-10.2
GhG Revenue	0.0	-0.1	Δ GhG Revenue	-0.1
Net Cost	-339 9	-474 6	A Net Cost	-134 7

Load Cost Category - Green indicates decrease & Red indicates Increase **Category of Gen Revenue**, **Congestion Revenue** & **GhG Revenue** - Green indicates increase & Red indicates decrease **Net Cost Category** – Green indicates Increase & Red indicates decrease

- "Net Cost" = potential benefit to BPA ~\$134 million
 - Δ Net Cost [339.9 474.6] = -134.7
 - Load Costs increase by ~\$22 million
 - Generation Revenue increases by ~\$146 million

BPA Result - Multiple Market Scenarios — 2026 M+ Main Split



[Negative Numbers = Revenue] [Positive Numbers = Costs]

E	BPA M+ Main Split Table (W/O Wheeling Revenue)							
Cost/Benefit (\$ millions)	BAU (2026)	Main Split (2026)	Δ Cost/Benefit Category	Main Split vs BAU				
Load Cost	921.7	923.6	Δ Load Cost	1.9				
Generation Cost	131.3	131.3	•	-				
Reserve Cost	0.0	0.2	-	-				
Generation Revenue	-1343.1	-1370.3	Δ Generation Revenue	-27.2				
Reserve Revenue	0.0	0.0	-	-				
Congestion Revenue	-49.9	-52.7	Δ Congestion Revenue	-2.8				
GhG Revenue	0.0	-0.8	Δ GhG Revenue	-0.8				
Net Cost	-339.9	-368.7	∆ Net Cost	-28.9				

Load Cost Category - Green indicates decrease & Red indicates Increase Category of Gen Revenue, Congestion Revenue & GhG Revenue - Green indicates increase & Red indicates decrease

Net Cost Category – Green indicates Increase & Red indicates decrease

- "Net Cost" = potential benefit to BPA of ~\$29 million
 - Δ Net Cost [339.9 368.7] = -28.9
 - Load Costs increase by ~\$2 million
 - Generation Revenue increases by ~\$27 million

BPA Result - Multiple Market Scenario - 2026 W+ Alt Split 1 DSW = EDAM & PNW = M4

[Negative Numbers = Revenue] [Positive Numbers = Costs]



	Footprint vs BAU							
Cost/Benefit (\$ millions)	BAU (2026)	Alt Split 1 (2026) DSW EDAM PNW M+ △ Cost/Benefit Category		Two Markets Alt Split 1 (2026) DSW EDAM PNW M+				
Load Cost	921.7	919.2	Δ Load Cost	2.5				
Generation Cost	131.3	131.3		-				
Reserve Cost	0.0	0.1		-				
Generation Revenu	-1343.1	-1359.5	Δ Generation Revenue	-16.5				
Reserve Revenue	0.0	0.0		-				
Congestion Reven	-49.9	-48.3	Δ Congestion Revenue	-1.6				
GhG Revenue	0.0	-0.7	Δ GhG Revenue	-0.7				
Net Cost	-339.9	-358.0	Δ Net Cost	-18.1				

Load Cost Category - Green indicates decrease & Red indicates Increase **Category of Gen Revenue**, **Congestion Revenue** & **GhG Revenue** - Green indicates increase & Red indicates decrease **Net Cost Category** – Green indicates Increase & Red indicates decrease

- "Net Costs" = potential benefit to Bonneville of ~\$18 million
 - Δ Net Cost [339.9 358.0] = -18.1
 - Load Costs decrease by ~\$2.5 million
 - Generation Revenue increases by ~\$16.5 million

BPA Result - Multiple Market Scenario – 2026 M+ Alt Split 2 PNW = EDAM DSW = M-1

[Negative Numbers = Revenue] [Positive Numbers = Costs]



	Footprint vs BAU							
Cost/Benefit (\$ millions)	BAU (2026)	Alt Split 2 (2026) PNW EDAM DSW M+	Δ Cost/Benefit Category	Two Markets Alt Split 2 (2026) PNW EDAM DSW M+				
Load Cost	921.7	982.0	Δ Load Cost	60.3				
Generation Cost	131.3	131.3		1				
Reserve Cost	0.0	0.0						
Generation Revenu	-1343.1	-1514.7	Δ Generation Revenue	-171.7				
Reserve Revenue	0.0	0.0		•				
Congestion Reven	-49.9	-49.1	Δ Congestion Revenue	-0.8				
GhG Revenue	0.0	-0.1	Δ GhG Revenue	-0.1				
Net Cost	-339.9	-450.7	∆ Net Cost	-110.8				

Load Cost Category - Green indicates decrease & Red indicates Increase **Category of Gen Revenue, Congestion Revenue & GhG Revenue** - Green indicates increase & Red indicates decrease **Net Cost Category** – Green indicates Increase & Red indicates decrease

- "Net Costs" = potential benefit to Bonneville of ~\$110 million
 - Δ Net Cost [339.9 450.7] = -110.8
 - Load Costs increase by ~\$60 million
 - Generation Revenue increases by ~\$171 million

BPA Result - Multiple Market Scenario





[Negative Numbers = Nevenue] [1 ositive Numbers = costs]							
Footprint vs BAU							
Cost/Benefit (\$ millions)	BAU (2026)	Alt Split 3 (2026) DSW & IPCO - EDAM PNW M+	Δ Cost/Benefit Category	Two Markets Alt Split 3 (2026) DSW & IPCO - EDAM PNW M+			
Load Cost	921.7	840.4	Δ Load Cost	81.3			
Generation Cost	131.3	131.3		-			
Reserve Cost	0.0	0.0		-			
Generation Revenu	-1343.1	-1151.6	Δ Generation Revenue	-191.5			
Reserve Revenue	0.0	0.0		-			
Congestion Reven	-49.9	-51.5	Δ Congestion Revenue	-1.6			
GhG Revenue	0.0	-0.6	Δ GhG Revenue	-0.6			
Net Cost	-339.9	-231.9	Δ Net Cost	-107.9			

[Negative Numbers = Revenue] [Positive Numbers = Costs

Load Cost Category - Green indicates decrease & Red indicates Increase Category of Gen Revenue, Congestion Revenue & GhG Revenue - Green indicates increase & Red indicates decrease

Net Cost Category - Green indicates Increase & Red indicates decrease

- "Net Cost" = potential decreased benefit to Bonneville of ~\$108 million
 - Δ Net Cost [339.9 231.9] = 107.9
 - Load Costs decrease by ~\$81 million
 - Generation Revenue decreases by ~\$191 million

BPA Result - Multiple Market Scenario – IPCO & NV = EDAM & PNW & DSW

[Negative Numbers = Revenue] [Positive Numbers = Costs]



Footprint vs BAU							
Cost/Benefit (\$ millions)	BAU (2026)	Alt Split 4 (2026) IPCO & NV EDAM PNW M+	Δ Cost/Benefit Category	Two Markets Alt Split 4 (2026) IPCO & NV EDAM PNW M+			
Load Cost	921.7	860.9	Δ Load Cost	60.8			
Generation Cost	131.3	131.3		-			
Reserve Cost	0.0	0.0		-			
Generation Revenu	-1343.1	-1220.0	Δ Generation Revenue	-123.0			
Reserve Revenue	0.0	0.0		-			
Congestion Reven	-49.9	-48.3	Δ Congestion Revenue	-1.6			
GhG Revenue	0.0	-0.5	Δ GhG Revenue	-0.5			
Net Cost	-339.9	-276.6	∆ Net Cost	-63.3			

Load Cost Category - Green indicates decrease & Red indicates Increase Category of Gen Revenue, Congestion Revenue & GhG Revenue - Green indicates increase & Red indicates decrease Net Cost Category - Green indicates Increase & Red indicates decrease

- "Net Cost" = potential decreased benefit to BPA of ~\$63 million
 - Δ Net Cost [339.9 276.6] = 63.3
 - Load Costs decrease ~\$60 million
 - Generation Revenue decreases by ~\$123 million



[Negative Numbers = Revenue] [Positive Numbers = Costs]


	[Negative Numbers = Revenue] [Positive Numbers = Costs]							
	Footprint vs BAU							
	Single Market EDAM Bookend	Two Markets Main Split	Two Markets Alt Split 1 (2026) DSW EDAM PNW M+	Two Markets Alt Split 2 (2026) PNW EDAM DSW M+	Two Markets Alt Split 3 (2026) DSW & IPCO - EDAM PNW M+	Two Markets Alt Split 4 (2026) IPCO & NV EDAM PNW M+		
Δ Load Cost	22.2	1.9	2.5	60.3	81.3	60.8		
Δ Generation Revenue	-146.6	-27.2	-16.5	-171.7	-191.5	-123.0		
Δ Congestion Revenue	-10.2	-2.8	-1.6	-0.8	-1.6	-1.6		
Δ GhG Revenue	- 0.1	-0.8	-0.7	-0.1	-0.6	-0.5		
∆ Net Cost	-134.7	-28.9	-18.1	-110.8	-107.9	-63.3		

Load Cost Category - Green indicates decrease & Red indicates Increase Category of Gen Revenue, Congestion Revenue & GhG Revenue - Green indicates increase & Red indicates decrease

Net Cost Category — Green indicates Increase & Red indicates decrease

- 4 of 6 scenarios reflect increased benefits for Bonneville greater than the BAU case
 - Significant difference between one market and two market footprints should not come as surprise to stakeholders
- A single market across the WECC interconnection is an unlikely outcome of day-ahead market developments
 - Caution should be taken in the acceptance of the benefit for Bonneville in a single market footprint as it is unlikely to materialize as depicted in the study due the likely establishment of two markets
- Benefits are influenced by make up of each footprint and along with the transmission connectivity accompanying each footprint

BPA Results – 2035 (Coordinated Balancies & Tx)



	Case					
Cost/Benefit (\$ mill	Main Split (2035)	Main Split M2M (2035)	Main Split M2M CBA (2035)	Main Split M2M CBA Tx (2035)		
Load Cost	1088.2	1102.9	1106.4	1132.6		
Generation Cost	131.3	131.3	131.3	131.3		
Reserve Cost	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.2		
Generation Revenu	-1463.5	-1487.7	-1492.9	-1704.6		
Reserve Revenue	0.0	0.0	-0.1	0.0		
Wheeling Revenue	-38.3	-37.4	-37.4	-31.7		
Congestion Revenu	-98.7	-102.4	-103.4	-74.9		
GhG Revenue	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Net Cost	-380.9	-393.1	-395.7	-547.1		



Study Result W/O "Wheeling Revenue" **Main Split** Main Split (2035) Main Split M2M 2026 Main 2026 2026 BAU M2M CBA Cost/Benefit (\$ millions) **EDAM Bookend No Coordination** Split CBA (2035) Tx (2035) **Load Cost** 943.98 1106.44 921.7 923.6 1088.22 1132.6 Generation Cost 131.3 131.3 131.31 131.31 131.31 131.3 Reserve Cost 0.2 0.00 0.14 0.25 0.2 0 Generation Revenue -1343.1 -1370.3 -1489.63 -1463.51 -1492.87 -1704.6 Reserve Revenue 0 0.0 0.00 -0.02 -0.06 0.0 Congestion Revenue -49.9-52.7 -60.13 -98.72 -103.38 -74.9 **GhG Revenue** 0 -0.8 -0.13 -0.01 -0.01 0.0 -339.91 **Net Cost** -368.67 -474.6 -342.6-358.32 -515.5

BPA Results – Comparison Japie 2035 (Coordinated Balancing & Tx)

	Δ Comparisons								
Cost/Benefit (\$ millions)	RTO vs 2026 BAU	RTO vs 2026 Main Split	RTO vs 2026 EDAM	RTO vs Main Split (2035) No Coordination	RTO vs Main Split CBA 2035				
Load Cost	210.9	209.0	188.6	44.4					
Generation Revenue	-361.6	-334.3	-215.0	-241.1	-211.7				
Congestion Revenue	-25.0	-22.2	-14.8	23.8	28.5				
GhG Revenue	0.0	0.8	0.1	0.0	0.0				
Δ Net Cost	-175.7	-146.7	-41.0	-172.9	-157.1				

Load Cost Category - Green indicates decrease & Red indicates Increase Category of Gen Revenue, Congestion Revenue & GhG Revenue - Green indicates increase & Red indicates decrease

- RTO participation is not part of the current process, however results showed benefits from an RTO that exceeded any DAM scenario. Therefore, it may be short sighted to not consider the viability of each market operator's path for potential future market opportunities
- Joining a DAM is not a short-term decision and participants in a DAM would not be able to simply change market
 operators in the without financial impact if their current market operator does not present a reasonable path to an
 RTO